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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 




THE DISTRICT c·ouRT OF THE 
SEYENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT' IN 
AND FOR CARBON CouNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, and ·GEORGE ·CHRiiSTEN-
SEN, one ;of the Judges thereof, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
This is an original action ibrought in the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah by the Utah Liquor Control 
C·ommission, against the 18eventh Judicial District C;ourt 
of the State of Utah in and for Carbon County, and 
George Christensen, one of its Judges, seeking a Writ of 
Prohibition and Wri~t ·Of Mandate in aid thereof. The 
question involved grows out of the issuance of .certain 
O:vder.s by defendant, the Honorable George Christensen, 
in .the ease of Uta,h Liquor Control Commission v. Victor 
Martelle, et al., being case No. 5064 in the District ~Court 
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of the Seventh Judicial District in and for Carbo·n Coun-
ty, Utah, wherein the plaintiff sought to rc.onfiscate cer-
tain whiskey, implements, fur'Iliture, fixtures and any 
other pers-onal property seized in a .certain beer parlor, 
known a.s the. Town Tavern, 2.22 South Main., Helper, 
Carbon County, Utah, by Inspe-ctors ;of the above named 
plaintiff under authority of Section 164, ·Chapter 43, 
Laws of Utah, 193-5. 
STATEMENT OF 'THE C1.A!SE. 
That ·bn the 25th day of January, 1940, Perry Holt, 
·Inspe-ctor of the Utah Liquor Control ·Commission, ap-
peared before J. W. Hammond, Justice o.f the Peace in 
rund for Price Precinct, Carbon ·County, Utah, and there 
signed an Information, (Exhibit '·'B") under .oath that 
intoxicating liquors were being sold, bartered and given 
a'\vay in violation of the Utah Liquor Control Act at 222-
. 2'24 South Main Street, Helper, Carbon County, Utah. 
Tthat upon the filing .of this Information J. W. Hammond 
issued a Search Warrant (EAhibit '' C ") commanding 
Perry Holt to search the premise-s named in said Infor-
mation and to seize allliquor~s a'nd vessels .containing the 
same and· all implements, furniture .and fixtures used or 
kept for such illegal selling, and bartering of liquors in 
violation .of the Liquor Laws ;of the State of Utah. ·That 
on January 26, 1940, Perry Holt, together with A. H. 
JaY'nes, .and other Inspe-ctors· of the Utah Liqu·or ~Control 
·commission, unde·r autho·rity of ·the .S.earch Warrant 
sea.r.che-d the premise-s in said Se·arch Warrant des·cribed 
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and found upon said premises a. quantity of whiskey. 
That at said time the said Inspectors seized the whiskey 
so found, together w·ith certain tangible personal prop-
erty then located in and upon said premises and at .said 
time took a c;omplete inventory of .said whiskey and :said 
tangible personal property so seized. o~. January 27, 
1940, Perry Holt made a. return on said Search Warrant, 
listing all of the property seized on said premises (Ex-
hibit '' D' ') said Return was filed together with .a War-
rant with J. W. Hamm·ond, .Ju.stice of the Peace. J. W. 
H·ammond later certified all the records and files in said 
matter to the District Court of the SevEID.th Judicial Dis-
trict in and for Carbon C·ounty, State ·Of Utah. ·That on 
said 27th day of J anua.ry, 1940, the said Perry Holt made 
a Return (Exhibit '·' E ") to the Seventh Judicial District 
Court in and for Carbon County, .State of Utah, and upo~n. 
the filing of said Return Judge ~GeoTge Clhristensen, 
Judge of said Seventh Judicial District Court in and for 
Carbon County, State of Utah, did issue a Warrant of 
Attachment (E·xhibit "F"), said Warrant of Attach-
ment listed all of the .arti,cles seized by Perry H.olt as 
listed in his Return on said Search Warrant. That on 
the said 27th da.y of January, 1940, Victor Martelle, ;one 
of the defendants 'named in said Return of P·erry H-olt, 
filed in the said S·even th J udici.al District Court, in and 
for Carbo·n County, State of Utah, his affidavit (Exhibit 
''·G' '),praying that the Court immediately issue an Order 
to Show Cause (Exhibit ''H"), direeted to Utah Liquor 
Contr:o1 C-ommission, its agents, serv.am.ts and employee·s, 
and particularly Perry Holt and· A. H. Jaynes, requiring 
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4 
them to appear before the said Court then and there to 
show cause why they shouldn't (be permanently re-
strained, dur~ng the pendency of the action, from remov-
ing .any of t1he tangible personal property Ho· seized by 
Perry I-Iolt from said premises. That upon the filing of 
this Affidavit, the Court, that is, the Honorable George 
Christensen, issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering 
the Utah Liquor ,C:ontrol Commissio~n, its .agents, ser-
vants and employees, and p·articularly Perry H·olt .and 
A. H. Jaynes, to appear before the said' Court at the 
hour of ten o'clock A. M. ·On the 5th day of F'ebruary, 
1940, to then and there show ·Cause why they be not re-
strained f:r:om removing said twngible personal property 
until the determination of said a.ction on its merits. That 
said Affidavit, and Order to ·Show Cause, were served 
upon said Perry Holt and A. H. Jaynes at the premises 
222-224 South M·ain, Helper, Carbon County, State of 
Utah, while ·Said Perry Holt and A. H. Jaynes were re-
m·oving the tangible personal pr-operty, listed in said 
Return of Inspector Holt, from the premises. That on 
the 29th day of January, 1940, ·George H. Lunt, one of 
the attorneys for the Utah Liquor Contr-ol Commission, 
served upon the said Victor Martelle and filed with the 
Court, the said Seventh Judicial District, a Motion to 
Va!c.ate, Rescind and Set Aside and Hold for Naught the 
Order to Show Cause (Exhibit ''I''). That on the 5th 
day .of February, 1940, the MotiO'n. to Va:eate and Set 
Aside, and ·the ·O:vder to Show c·ause were heard by the 
Court and that on the 8th day of F:ehruary, 1940, the said 
George Christensen, Judge of the ··said Court, made and 
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5 
entered ·an Order (Exhibit "M") decreeing among other 
things that the Utah Liqu·or Control Commission, its 
serva,nts and employees be restrained from removing 
anything and everything from said premises at 22·2-224 
South Main, Helper, Ca:r1hon County, State of Utah, ex-
cept any personal property which could be used only and 
exclusively for t1he purpose ~~ viola.ting the Liquor ·Con-
trol Act of the State of Utah. 'That o~n the said 5th day 
of February, 1940, the Utah Liquor C·ontrol C:ommission 
filed its Libel of Information (Exhibit "J") asking for 
the condemnation and forfeiture· of the property seized 
on the premises above named an·d as listed in the Return 
of Inspector P-erry Holt. Along with said Libel of In-
formation the above Court signed an Order to Show 
Cause (Exhibit "K'') ordering tlhe defend'ants n.amed in 
said Libel of Information tn show cause, if any they 
have, ·On the 19th day of F:ehruary, 1940, w·hy the s.aid 
tangible personal property should not be forfeited and 
it further ordered that N-otice of Hearing be given as 
provided by law (Exhibit '''L"). 
·The sole question for determination is wih!ether the 
HonoraJble George Christensen, a.s judge of the ·Seventh 
Judicial Court, exceeded the juri~sdiction of that court 
when he issued the Order of January 27, 1940, requiring 
the plaintiff herein to ·shnw ·Cause why it should not he 
restrained from rem-oving the personal property, listed 
in the Inspector's Return, from t1he Town Tavern. Also 
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6 
whether the Court exceeds its jurisdi,ction when it issued 
its Order of February 8, 1940, wherein pla'in.tiff was re-
strained from removing the personal pr-operty from the 
Town Tavern. 
PLAINTIFF''S CO·NTEN'TIO·N. 
Plaintiff contends that the .orders above referred to 
were in excess of the jurisdiction ·of the .court because 
A. That said ·Orders interfered with, hindered and 
ma.de impossible the enforcement ·of the Utah Liquor 
·Control Act, the enforcement of which were, and are, 
the plain duty of plaintiff. 
B. That the Liquor ·C:ontrol Act and particularly 
,Sections 168 ·and 169 provide an adequate legal proceed-
ings to pr.otec.t the interests of Victor Martelle and the 
orders ·complained of are not provided for and are con-
tr.ary to the procedure outlined in said sections. 
ARGUME·NT. 
Article V, Section 1, of the C:onstitution. of the State 
o£ Utah, .provide for the Distribution of P:owers into 
three departments of government, as follows: 
''The powers of the government of the State of 
Utah shall be divided into three distinct depart-
ments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the 
Judicial; ~and no .Person charged with the exer-
cise of power·s pr.operly belonging to .one of these 
departments, shall exercise any functions apper-
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7 
taining to either of the others, except in the cases 
herein expres.sly directed or :permitted.'' 
The plaintiff is a. commission organized by the laws of 
this State and is a. br·a~nch of the Exe.cutive department 
of the State Government. 
In proceedings ·Of this sort this ~Court ·has power and 
authority to grant the type of relief, which in its judg-
ment -protects all parties regardless of whether it is 
Mandamus ·or Prohibition, that is, they have the authority 
to is·sue both Writs -of Mandamus and Prohibition, if 
both are ne-ces·sary to adequately protect the rights of the 
parties. 
In the case of 
C,hrild, et al., vs. Ogden St'a;te Bavnk, et al., 
20 Pac. (2d) 599, p. ·603, 81 Utah 464, 
the court has the following to say with respect to this 
matter: 
''An examination of the statement of positions of 
the partie-s reveal·s a situation that calls for a 
type of relief m:ore n.ea.r ly .analogous to the pur-
pose of a Writ of Mandamus than to a Writ of 
Prohibition, and ·at the same time standing alone 
neither \vould bring albout the desired result. 'That 
this Court ha.s the .authority to issue both Writs •of 
Mandamus and Prohibition in s1ic:h a case is mani-
fest. Cornstitution of Utah, Article 7, Section 4; 
Compiled Laws of Utah, 1917, Section 1643. It is 
not the title but the subject matter of the petition 
or -complaint and .ans\Yer that reveals the ques-
tion ·submitted and determines the relief called 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
for, and whether by Prohibition, by Mandamus, or 
by ·combination of hoth. The questions pre·sented 
are so rel-ated and in terdependant that adequate 
relief may be had .only by granting of both forms 
of relief. We see no reason w)hy this Court should 
not proceed to grant such relief as will adequately 
protect ,all parties and hasten. the determination 
of the proceeding -and bring alhout promptness and 
expedition in the liquidation of the bank. Com-
piled Laws of Utah, 1917, ~S:e,ction 7407. 'The 'Vrit 
of Prohibition i·s the counterpart o.f the Writ of 
Mandate, it arrests the proceedings of any tri-
bunal, ·eorpora.tion, board ·OT person, whether ex-
ercising functions judicial or ministerial when 
such proceedings rare without or in excess of the 
jurisdiction of such tribunal, corporation, hoard 
or person.' " 
The law of this state seems well settled in proceedings 
wherein Mandamus or Prohibition i·s sought against a. 
judi·cial tribunal, that the question is one of jurisdiction 
and not ·error. In other w·ords, the Court in. such pro-
ceedings does not determine how an inferior tribunal shall 
act but determine-s whether or not the Court has au-
thority to ,a,ct with reference to the particular matter in-
volved. ·The power to do a judi·eial act must always un-
derlie the d·oing of it. T1he provinces of the Writ of Pto-
hibition or Writ of Mandamus i·s designed to keep in-
ferior judic~al and executive bodies within the limits of 
their jurisdiction. ·This questio11 resolves into this, did 
the Seventih Judicial District Cnurt have power to issue 
its 0Tder.s of January 27, 1940 a:nd February 8, 1940, 
above referred to. We recognize that it is not a question 
of whether the court acted ·Corre-ctly or incorrectly, but 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
whether the judicial act was, itself, warranted fby law. 
A leading ease on this subjec:t is 
.... 4.ttcood vs. Cox, District Judge, 
88 Utah 437 at 445, 55 Pac. (2d) 377. 
The n1atter is gone into quite extensively in this case a.nd 
numerous authorities are -cited. The following is taken 
from this case in discussing the question of jurisdiction: 
·'They all mean fundamentally, the power or 
capacity given by law to a court, tribunal, board, 
~body or officer to entertain, hear and determine 
.certain controversies. The word is derived from 
juris dicta-, 'I speak by the law'. It does not mean 
that the court must speak correctly .by the law. 
What it says may be incorrect. But it means 
that its judicial action in respect to the matter 
in regard to which the action pertains must itself 
he warranted by law. It does not mean that it 
must act or operate upon a controversy cor-
rectly, but it means that the law must permit it 
to act upon. the ·C01?Jtr.oV'er sy Juris diction 
can never depend upon the merits of the case 
brought before the Court, 'but only upon its right 
to hear a;nd decide at all.' . . . 17 Standard 
Encyc. of Proc. pages 658, 659, it is stated, 'The 
test of the jurisdiction of the C-ourt to grant 
relief is not whether good cause for granting the 
relief exists, but whether the tribu.nal assuming 
to act had power to enter upon the enquiry in the 
particular case, or grant the relief for any cause, 
and this must be sought for in the general nature 
of the pottvers of the court or the general law·s 
defining this ju.risdiction. . . . State vs. Stobie, 
19·4 Mo. 14, 92 S. W. 191, 197, 'Ju.risdiction is au,... 
thority to hear and d:etermine a cause. Since juris-
diction is the power to hear and determine, it 
does not depend either upon the regularity of 
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10 
the exercise of that power or u.pon the rightful-
ness of decisions made.' ". 
It is the contention ·of the plaintiff in this case that 
the Order.s signed by the ·C·ourt on January 27, 1940 and 
February 8, 1940 were beyond its power and authority. 
The distinction between what amounts to jurisdiction and 
error discussed in the case of 
Olsen vs. District Court of Salt Lake 
County, et atl., 93 Utah 145, 71 p·a·c. (2d) 
529. 
In that ·case the .complaint was filed and the defendant 
interposed a demurrer. Affidavit and notice was served 
on .attorn~y for plaintiff by defendant to· take plaintiff's 
deposition. The plaintiff failed to Hppear and the court 
overruled the demurrer .of defendant, at which time the 
defendant called attention to the ,c.ourt that it had served 
a notice on the plaintiff's .attorney .of the taking of plain-
tiff's deposition ·and that he hBJd failed to appear so the 
court without anything further overruled the demurrer 
and made an ·Order that the defendant would have ten 
days from the time the plain tiff .appeared to have- 1h~s de-
position taken i:n which to file his an·swer. The p1aintiff 
took the matter up to this court on certior,ari. The court 
has the following to say: 
"It appears to us from the foregoing that the 
Court did not regularly pursue the authority con-
ferred, while the lower court in its order disposed 
of the den1urrer and so far as that matter \Yas 
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concerned \Vas acting ''rithin the authority con-
ferred or by warrant of law, yet it injected into 
the order making disposition of the demurrer and 
as a part thereof an Order which there was no 
\Yarrant in la\Y for it to make and which had no 
bearing on the matter presented by the demurrer. 
Its jurisdiction in that regard had not been in-
voked by anything bef·oTe the Court and its con-
clusions in regard thereto were wholly without 
support in law. Certainly the Court did not 
regularly pursue the authority conferred and 
to that extent exceeded its jurisdiction.'' 
T,his ca-se is authority for the prop·osition that a court. in 
the commencement of proceedings ma.y have jurisdiction 
but it does not follow that all-orders and aets of the court 
thereafter made in the proeeedings are likewise within 
its jurisdiction. It then becomes a question of jurisdirc:-
tion and not one of error. 
In the a.bove case the Court had jurisdiction of the 
subject matter but with reference to the order·s hereto-
fore referred to the defendant Court exceeded its juris-
diction. 
Writ of Prohibition or Writ of Mandamus will lie 
when it is Slhown that an inferior tribunal ha;s exceed.ed 
its jurisdiction .and that the party seekin,g the writ has 
no plain, speedy and adequate relief at law. 
Construction Securities Co. vs. District 
Court of Third Jttdicial District, in and 
for Salt Lake Cownty, et al., 39 Pac. 
(2d) 707, 85 Utah 346. 
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A. THE ORDERS OF THE DEFENDANT C'OURT HINDERED 
AND MADE THE' ENFORCE.MENT OF THE UTAH LIQUOR 
CONTROL. ACT' AN IMPOSSIBILITY AND PREVENTEID 
PLAINTI~F F'ROM DISCHARGING THE DUTIES IMPOSED 
ON IT BY LAW. 
You will observe that from the .statement of facts 
Perry Holt was an Inspector f.nr the Utah Liquor Control 
Commission, and upon the :filing of an .. affidavit or infor-
mation with the Justice .of the Peace, obtained a Search 
Warrant to search the premises at 2.22-224 South ·Main, 
Helper, Carbon County, State ·Of Utah, and armed with 
this search warrant he did sear.ch the premises and he 
found a quantity of whiskey unlawfully kept on said 
premises. That he arrested the man in ·ch.arge, seized 
the "WJhliskey together with certain personal property list-
ed in ·his Return .and made return to tlie Justice of the 
Peace. The actions of P·erry H·olt in securing the search 
warrant, in searchin.g the premises and .seizing the prop-
erty w.as pursuant to the authority conferred in Section 
164, Chapter 43, Law·s of Utah, 1935, whiCJh1 reads as 
follows: 
If any district, county, city or tovvn attorney, or 
any peace officer, or any other person has probable 
cause to believe that al·coho1ic beverages are pos-
·Sessed, manufactured, sold, hartered, given away 
·nr otherwise furnished in violation of this act, 
or are kept for the purpose of selling, bartering 
or giving away or otherwise furnishing the same 
in violation of law, it shall be the duty of such 
attorney, peace officer or person forthwith to 
make and file with the judge .of the district or 
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13 
city court, or any city, town or precinct justice 
of the peace, written inforn1ation supported by 
his oath or affirmation that he has information 
and reason to belive that this act is being violated 
at a certain place, stating the facts within his 
know·1edge ~ and he shall describe as particularly 
as n1ay be the place, and the names of the persons, 
if known, participating in such unlawful act. Such 
judge or justice of the peace, upon finding prob-
able cause to believe that the facts stated in such 
information are true, ·Shall issue a search war-
rant, directed to any peace officer in the -county 
whom the complainant may designate if he shall 
designate such peace .·o-fficer, otherwise to any 
peace officer in the county, describing as partic-
ularly as may be the alcoholic :beverages and the 
place des-cribed in said information, and the per-
sons named or described therein as the owners 
or keepers of such alcoholic beverages; com-
manding the officer to search thor·oughly the place, 
and, on finding alcoholic beverages in unlawful 
possession or use, to arrest persons found therein 
and bring them before the court of justice, to 
seize such alcoholic beverages, with the vessels 
containing them, and all implements, furniture 
and fixtures used or kept for ·such illegal acts, and 
to keep the same securely until final a.ction is ha.d 
thereon. Whereup·on the officer to whom such war-
rant .shall ihe delivered shall forthwith obey and 
execute as effectively as possible the commands 
of the warrant, and make return promptly ·of his 
doing to the court or justice, with an itemized 
inventory of all alcoholic beverages and property 
or things seized, and a list of all persons in whose 
possession the same were f.ound, if any; and, if 
no person is found in possession of such alcoholic 
beverages or property, his return shall so state. 
Such officer shall securely keep all alcoholic bev-
erages and other things S·O seized by him until 
final action is had thereon. A copy of the war-
rant shall be served upon the person or persons 
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found in possession of any alcoholic beverages, 
furniture or fixtures so seized, and, if no person 
is found in possession thereof, a copy of the war-
rant shall be posted in a conspicuous place on the 
building or room wherein the same are found. 
It will be observed from this section that it was manda-
tory for Perry Holt, upon finding liquor unlawfully kept 
on said premises, to take i'n.to his po,ssession the whiskey, 
together with the implements, furniture and fixtures 
located on .s.aid premises, used or kept in connection with 
the violation and make his return as provided by law. 
'Section 168, ·Chapter 49', Laws of U truh', 1937, amon.g 
·other things, provides tlie procedure after sueh a seizure, 
to-wit: 
In the event of a seizure as pr·o·vided for in Sec-
tion 164, the officer shall forthwith make a return 
of his acts thereunder, and if the warrant was 
.issued by a .city court or justice of the peace and 
by such return it .appears that tangible pe~s'Onal 
property "\\7as seized by said officer, the jurisdic-
tion of the city court or justice of the peace ·Shall 
thereupon ·cease except that the city court or 
justice issuing such warrant shall forthwith ·cer-
tify the record and all files to the district court 
of the county in which said premises are situated 
and from the time of filing such records and files 
with the clerk of the district court it shall have 
jurisdiction to proceed with the caus~ and deter-
mine the merits thereof as provided by law. 
This section w.as followed by Insperetor P·erry Holt. 
Inspector Holt was .a peace .officer at the time of the 
seizure. Section 174, Chapter 43, Laws of Utah, 1935, 
set forth: 
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Inspectors appointed under this act, sheriffs, 
deputy sheriffs, -constables, marshals, police of-
ficers, n1embers of the state highway patrol, and 
other officers and employes of the state, and -of 
any subdivision or agency thereof, are vested with 
the powers of peace officers and powers necessary 
to enforce the provisions of this act. 
From the fact·s and from the law qu.oted there is no 
question but that Perry Holt, as' Inspector for the Plain-
tiff, was discharging a plain mandatory duty imposed 
upon him by lawr. The mandate ·Of the statute, upon find-
ing liquor unlawfully kept on the premises, is to seize 
the implements, furniture and fixtures therein kept in 
connectio-n with the violation and to take the same into 
his possession. The power to seize carries with it the 
power to remove t1he enumerated personal property to a 
place of safe keepin.g is recognized by all the courts. A 
leading case on this pr·oposition is 
Stork Restaurant Corporation vs. Mc-
Campbell, 55 Fed. (2d) 687 N. Y. 
Plaintiff invoked the jurisdiction of the ·Court on the 
ground that the proposed acti·on of defendants would 
violate the eonstitutional provisions against deprivin.g 
a. person of his property without due process of law. 
Plaintiff alleged that pr01hlibiti·nn agents under defend-
ants direction, entered and took pos,session of plaintiff's 
premises, made arrests and were preparing to· remove 
furnishings and fixtures. Plaintiff alleged irreparable 
damage, etc., and asks for restraining order. On the 
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question of the .officers right to remove the property tihe 
court said : 
"As a general proposition, the right of a public 
officer to seize personal property -carriers with 
it the right to remove the property from the 
premises. This is certainly true of a sheriff on 
attachment, or execution, unless removal would 
result in destruction of the property. 'When he 
seizes, he may remove it for safe keeping, and this 
is not only to give effect to the seizure, but for 
his own security'. Catlin v. Jackson, 8 J.ohns. 
(N.Y.) 520, 548. See also Mills v. Camp, 14 Conn. 
219, 36 Am. Dec. 488; Williams v. Powell, 101 
Mass. 467, 3 Am. Rep. 396.; Fullam v. Stearns, 
30 Vt. 443; Grey v. Sheridan Electric Light Co., 
19 Abb. N. C. (N. Y.) 152, 155. It must be fully 
as true in the case of an offi-cer exercising the 
right of distraint or of seizure forfeiture. The 
denial of power to remove seized articles to a 
place ·of security designated by law or selected 
iby the officer would beyond doubt be an unwar-
ranted restraint upon him and might seriously 
·cripple the enforcement of the law. In fact, it is 
a trespass for the officers to remain on the prem-
ises longer than is necessary to remove the seized 
property, unless they have the owner's permis-
sion. See United States v. American Brewing 
Co., (D. C.) 296 F. 772, 777; Rowley v. Rice, 11 
Mete. (Mass.) 337. It is plain, therefore, that 
~sueh articles as the defendant had the right to 
seize on the plaintiff's premises be has the right 
to remove from the plaintiff's premises." 
On the question of the court-s jurisdiction to issue the 
injunction prayed for the court said @ 690: 
''Temporary injun·ction against a public officer 
can be granted only on a strong showing that his 
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threatened action is beyond the scope of his law-
ful authority. . ·Courts will not issue in-
junctions against administrativ\e officers on the 
mere chance that they may not follow the law.'' 
At this point it must be borne in mind by this C.ourt 
that the Orders signed by the defendant Court prevented 
and made impossible the removin,g ·of the implements, 
furniture and fixtures from said premises by Perry Holt. 
It, therefore, made impossible the carrying out of the 
plain, mandatory provision·s :of the statute and interfered 
and prevented the enforceme·nt of the Utah Liquor Con-
trol Act. This is peculiarly significant in view of the fa,ct 
that this Court has held in the ease -of 
Wooras vs. Utah Liquor Control Commis-
sion, ______ Utah ------, 93 Pa.c. (2d) 45·5 
that in a Libel proceeding the action is against the thing, 
it tbeing an a-ction in rem. That the thing, itself, is the 
offender and that seizure of the property, or the res, is 
equiv.alent to the arrest of tibe person in a criminal case. 
By the acts of the defendant C·ourt, as complained of, 
plaintiff 'vas unable to make a proper seizure (arrest) 
and the property was, a.s a result, .allowed to· remain in, 
the premises under the same conditi·on.s to be used from 
that time on in connection with the violation of the Utah 
Liquor Control Act. Sectio·n 200, Chapter 43, Laws of 
Utah, 19·35, recognizes no property rights in this type 
of property, to-wit: 
There .shall he no property rights whatsoever in 
any alcoholic beverages, packages, vessels, ap-
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pliances, fixtures, bars, furniture and implements 
kept or used for the purpose of violating, or used 
in violation of, any provision of this act. 
T'he law seems to be yery definitely fixed that courts 
.cannot, by its orders, pro-cesses or .a,ctiorns, interfere with, 
impede, hinder and prevent public official·s, their agents, 
.servants and employees, from ·enforcing the law and dis-
charging a duty in1posed upon them as such by law and 
when Courts assume to act, and by its orders and pro-
cesses do act, with reference tn ma.tter·s the effect of 
w·hich is to hinder, delay, interfere with, impede and pre-
vent such public officials, t1heir agents, .servants and em-
ployees, from discharging duties imposed upon them by 
law then such BJets op. the part of the court are in excess 
of their jurisdiction .and are without authority in law. 
That Courts exeeed their jurisdiction when they, by 
their orders and processes, interfere with t!he ordinary 
functions of other branches of government, particularly 
the executive department, is borne out by the following 
case: 
Selecmarn, et al., v. Ma.tthews, et al., State 
H'ightva.y Commission, 15 ,S.. \V. (2d) 
7'88. 
"Wbere injunction proceedings were 0ommenced against 
the Highway ·Commi·ssion over changing the location of 
certain roads. The law ·of the State confers the powers 
to locate state highways upon. the Highway C·ommis.sion, 
etc., 
"But if it be -contended that the statute as a whole 
contains implications which require state high-
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'vays to be 'located in the interest of economy 
and directness of routes,' it is sufficient to sa!· 
that the power to determine the facts in every 
case is vested exclusively in the state highway 
comn1ission ; if the Legislature had in tended that 
the commission's findings should be subjected to 
judicial review, it doubtless would have said so. 
'An officer to whom public duties are confided by 
law, is not subject to the control of the .courts in 
the exercise of the judgment and discretion which 
the law reo·oses in him as a part ·of his official 
functions. Certain powers and duties are confided 
to those officers, and to them alone, and hovvever 
the courts may, in ascertaining the rights of par-
ties in suits properly before them, pass upon the 
legality of their acts, after the matter has once 
passed bey·ond their control, there exists no pOV\Ter 
in the courts, by any of its processes, to act upon 
the officer so as to interfere with the exercise of 
that jud~ent while the matter is properly before 
him for action. The reason for this is, that the 
law reposes this discretion in him f.or that occa-
sion, and not in the courts. The doctrine, there-
fore, is as ap·plicable to the writ, of injunction as 
it is to the writ of mandamus.' Gaines v. Thomp-
son, 7 Wall. 34 7, 352, 19 L. Ed. 62, 65, Kearney 
v. Laird, 164 Mo. App. 406, 144 S. W. 904. 
To grant an injunction in this case w·ould be to 
interfere with the ordinary functions of the ex-
·ecutive department of the state government; that 
the ·courts will not do. Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 
U. S. 627, 34 S. Ct. 938, 5S L. Eid. 1'506. '' 
In an action brought by certain taxpayers to enjoin 
Superintendent of .S,chool~ from designating certain 
school district, etc., the court in 
Moore et al. v. Porterfield, et al., 
257 Pac. 307 (Okla.) 
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"The law presumes the validity and regularity of 
their ·official duty, and this presumption obtains 
until overcome by proof, as to the acts involving 
the performance of ministerial or administrative 
duties. Watkins v. Havighorst, 13 Okl. 128, 74 
P~a.c. 318. 
Under section 3, art. 13, of the Constitution of 
Oklahoma, separate schools for white and colored 
-children, with like accommodations, must be pro-
vided by the Legislature, which must be impar-
tially maintained. 
We cannot presume that the defendant, as county 
superintendent of public instruction, will violate 
the foregoing provisions of our Constitution, but, 
on the contrary, we must presume that he will 
do his duty. Under Section 3, Chapter 219, article 
15, Session Laws of 1913 (section 10569, C. 0. S. 
1921), as construed by J urn per et al. v. Lyles, 77 
Okl. 57, 185 Pac. 1084, the county superintendent 
of public instruction of a county is authorized 
to designate what school or schools in each school 
district shall be the separate s.chool, and which 
class of children, either white or colored, shall 
have the privilege of attending such separate 
school or schools of said school district. This 
discretionary power of the county superintendent 
will not be controlled by injunction, unless it ap-
pears that such contemplated action is based upon 
grounds or reasons .clearly untenable ·Or unrea-
sonable." 
J( elley v. J( avanaugh, Chief of Police, 
3 Fed. Supp. 6·66. 
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An action \Yas br·ought for an injunction restraining the 
defendant from seizing· and destroying certain mint vend-
ing machines. There the court said : 
''Courts of equity have no power to restrain pub-
lic officers by injunction fron1 acts which they are 
require-d by law to perform. Mere apprehension 
of unauthorized acts by public officers will not 
authorize the issuance ,of an injunction. Proof of 
threatened breach of authority must be clear and 
convincing. This rule is specially applicable 
\Yhere the application for a temporary injunction 
is based upon affidavits. See Corpus Juris, pages 
240 et ·seq.; Triangle Mint Corp v. Mulrooney, 
257 N. Y. 200, 177 N. E. 420. 
In view of this denial and upon all of the proofs 
submitted upon this motion, the application for 
a temporary injunction should be denied. The 
presumption may be indulged in that defendant 
will observe the decision of the Circuit Court of 
Appeals and refrain from the :seizure of plain-
tiff's nonconvertible mint vending machines pend-
ing the trial of the case. Of course, it is possible 
some method or means may be employed whereby 
the machines in question are used for gambling 
pur.pnses. In that event, upon the proof that any 
particular machine is being used for gambling 
purpose, defendant, not only has the right, but 
it is his duty, to seize, such machine and arrest the 
person in possession thereof.'' 
Likewise the court \vill prohilbit \Yhen an injunction 
is issued which ex·ceeds the jurisdi~c.tion of the Court. In 
Gordon, et al. v. Smitlz, Chancellor, 
120 S. W. (2d) 325. 
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This was a petition for restraining order against the 
Superintendent of the Arkansas Police, .and .other of~ 
ficers, to restrain them from arresting, threatening to 
arrest, etc., plaintiffs, or other ·citizens for operating 
automobiles upon the highways. The .court issued a tem-
porary restraining order, and the petitioners filed their 
petition for a Writ .o.f Prohibition, alleging t1hat the 
chancery ·court of Union County had no jurisdiction for 
the reason that the con1.plai·nt seeks to- enjoin the enforce-
ment of a criminal statute, and .seeks to endoin the crimi-
nal prosecution of per.s-ons who have not complied with 
t1he provisions of the law. 
''The office of the writ of prohibition is tn re-
strain an inferior tribunal from proceeding in a 
matter :not within its jurisdiction; it is never 
granted unless the inferior tribunal has clearly 
exceeded its authority and the party applying for 
it has no other protection against the wr·ong that 
shall be done by such usurpation. We have many 
times held that when the Court has jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and the question of its 
jurisdiction of the pers·on turns upon some fact 
to be determined by the court, its decision that 
it has jurisdiction is an error, and prohibition is 
not the remedy. But in the instant case, the court 
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and 
the question of the existence or non-existence of 
jurisdiction does not depend on contested facts 
which the inferior court is competent to inquire 
into and determine~ Sparkman Hardwood Lum-
ber Co. v. Bush, 189 Ark. 391, 7·2 S. E. (2d) 527. 
'Chancery ·courts will not interfere by way ·of in-
junction to prevent anticipated criminal prose-
~cutions. The .city through her citizens has. the 
right to enforce the ordinance, if valid. A court 
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question as to the validity of the ordinance and 
restrain prosecutions pen·ding the determination 
of that question, as the whole matter ·can be settled 
in a court of law where only the violati·on of the 
ordinance, if valid, can be punished.' Rider v. 
Leatherman, 85 Ark. 230, 107 S. ,V. 996, 997. 
The ·suit in the chancery court was for the purpose 
of restraining prosecutions under a criminal 
statute. There are no contested facts which the 
lower court might examine and determine as to 
its jurisdiction, but the court had no jurisdiction 
of the subject matter. 
The chancery court had no jurisdiction and the 
writ of prohibition is therefore granted.'' 
When an executive offieer is directed by la.w to per-
form a .certain duty the courts have n~o' jurisdiction to 
interfere with the performance of that duty. In 
State ex rel. Carson, Dist. Atty. v. K ozer, 
Secretary of State, 270 Pac. 513, 226 
Ore. 641. 
This suit was instituted by the State Highway Commis-
sion of Oregon to obtain an injunction. against the de-
fendant, as secretary of State, to enjoin him from certi-
fying and printi·ng ·On the official ballot for the ensuing 
election the ballot title and numbers of proposed initiative 
measure to amend the existing motor ve·hicle law. It was 
admitted that the .se.cretary of state had followed the stat-
ute with reference to this matter. The court says: 
"Where an initiative· petition has been filed in 
the office of the secretary of state, is in pr.oper 
form, properly verified, contains the requisite 
number of signatures, and shows upon its face 
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that all of the statutory directions entitling it to 
be filed have been ·complied with, the statute 
makes it the imperative duty of the secretary of 
.state to file the petition, and, upon its bei·ng filed, 
to ,eertify a.nd print t1he ballot title and numbers 
on the official ballot, so that it ·can be voted upon. 
The relator contends that, in the performance of 
this duty by the secretary of state, he was acting 
in a ministerial capacity, and was not engaged in 
any legislation, and argues from this that the 
courts do have power to enjoin the secretary of 
state if the bill itself, when enacted, would be 
unconstitutional. Where the law defines and pre-
scribes the duty to be performed with such pre-
cision and certainty as to leave nothing to the 
exercise of diseretion or judgment, the act is 
ministerial. 34 C. J. 1179. 
It is clear that no executive officer can exercise 
any legislative power, and that the acts of the 
secretary of state in accepting and filing an in-
itiative measure, where all statutory requirements 
have been complied with, and in certifying and 
printing the ballot title and numbers of the meas-
ure on the official ballot, are ministerial in nature, 
and that he is not exercising .any legislative power, 
but is performing the acts which, under the .stat-
ute, are essential to the exercise of the legisla-
tive power by the people of the state, and, while 
he is acting purely in a ministerial capacity, and 
not exercising any discretion, the law itself en-
j·oins upon him the p·erformance of the .acts them-
selves, and it would seem to follow, as a necessary 
·consequence, where a duty is imposed upon a pub-
lic offi.cial to do an official act, upon compliance 
by others of all the statutory requirements nec-
essary to make it the duty of the official to do the 
act, that no court would have power to enjoin 
the officer from the doing of such act. Under 
the circumstances stated, the direction·s of the 
statute upon the secretary of state are plainly 
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mandatory, and require the performance by him 
·of the very duty which relator :seeks to have the 
·Court enjoin him from doing. The courts have 
no po,Yer to direct a public official to refuse to 
perform a duty imposed upon him by the man-
datory provisions ·of the statute.'' 
There are numerous ·other cases in many juri·sdic-
tions that hold \Yith t1he above cases, that acts of courts 
that prevent or hinder public ;officials from carrying out 
the duties and doing the things imposed on them by the 
clear provisions -of the law, are in e~cess of their juris-
dicti·on and therefore without authority of law. 
With respect to acts, orders .aTid pr;o,ces-ses of courts 
WJhich interfere with and prevent the enfor·cement of 
criminal statutes and the arrest of law violators, it .see~s 
to be the almost universal rule, that such acts, orders and 
processes are in excess of the juri.sdicti.on of the court. 
We call the 0ourt 's attention, by title a·nd citation only, 
to a number of cases that adhere to this view: 
Harmon, et al., vs. Commissioner of Police 
of Boston, 174 N. E. 198; · 
Strand Amusement Co., et al., vs. City of 
Owensboro, et al., 47 S. W. (2d) 710, 
Ky.; 
Dell Pub. Co. vs. Beggans, Direct-or of Pub-
lic Safety, et a.l., 158 Atl. 765 N. J. 
Harvie vs. Heise, Sheriff, et al., 
148 S. E. 66. So. Car.; 
Colbert, Sheriff of Carbon County, et al., 
vs. Su.perior Confection Co., 6 Pac. (2d) 
791, Okla. ; , 
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Collison vs. Kirkpatrick, 
292 Pae. 54, Okla. 
B. THAT THE LIQUOR CONTROL ACT AND PARTICULAR-
LY SECTIONS 16·8 AND 169 PROVIDE AN ADEQUATE 
l..~EGAL PROCEEDINGS TO PROTECT THE. INTERESTS 
OF VICTOR MARTELLE AND THE ORDER COMPLAINED 
·OF ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR AND ARE CONTRARY TO 
·THE PROCEDURE OUTLINED IN SAID SECTIONS. 
Under ·Se-ction 168, ·supra, after the Inspeetor has 
made his return the Justice ,certifies all of the records 
and files to the District Court -of the County and the Dis-
trict Court, from then on, has jurisdiction to determine 
the merits of the case. The court is required to fix time 
for. hearing and .cause notice thereon to be served per-
sonally and by posting which .shall describe the alc.oholic 
beverages and the persional property that has !been seized, 
to .specify the time and place for hearing. Should anyone 
appear and ,claim any of the property involved shall be 
made a party to the proceedings. The se-ction then pro-
vides a.s foll,ows: 
lf the court shall find from the evidence presented 
that violations of this act did occur upon the 
premise wherein said alcoholic beverages or other 
tangible personal property so seized by said ar-
resting officer which was located upon said prem-
ises was also used in connection with violation 
·of this act and shall be forfeited as hereafter 
provided unless any of the claimants prove to 
the satisfaction of the eourt. that said tangible 
personal property or some parts thereof were not 
used for any purpose whatsoever in connection 
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\vith the operation of the business conducted on 
the premises where .said personal property was 
seized. 
The Legislature undoubtedly intended Section 168 to, he 
the exclusive method of proceeding .after evidence of a · 
violation of the Liquor Act had be·come available to the 
Comm.issi<Yn. This is made very manifest by Section 169 
which reads as £ollows : 
When any alcoholi~c beverage, packages, prop-
erty or other things shall have been seized by 
virtue of any warrant, the same shall not· be dis-
charged or returned to any person claiming the 
.same by reason of any alleged insufficiency of 
des·cription i·n the \Varrant, ot the aleoholic bev-
·erages, property or place, nor by order in claim 
and delivery, or any other _summary pr,ocess, but 
the claimant shall only have the right to be heard 
on the merits of the ·case; and final judgment of 
conviction in such proceedings shall in all. cases 
be a bar to all suits for the recovery of any alco-
holic beverages or ·other things seized, or o£ · the 
value ·of the same, or for damages alleged to have 
arisen 'by reason of the ·seizing and detention 
thereof. 
The law is quite uniform that a pr-e;sumption attends 
the acts of the public officer, to the effe-ct that t·he- facts 
exist which justifies his action. In other wor.ds, there is 
always a presumption that official a1crts have been and are 
properly performed, and in general, it is to be pre.sumed 
that everything d·one by ,a•n official in connection with 
the performance of an .official act in the line o£" his duty 
was legally done, whether prior to the act, such as giving 
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notice, or de,termining the existence of conditions pre-
scribed as a prerequisite to legal acti~on, or subsequent 
to such act, 
22 C. J. Pages 130-34 
unles·s the presumption of regularity is rebutted, it is 
conclusive. 
22 C. J. Page 136 
A·c:ts of a public officer ''which pre.suppose the existence 
of other acts which makes them legally operative are pre-
sumptive proof in the matter." 
R. H. Stearns vs. U. 8., 78 L. Ed. 647-653 
quoting a principle announced by U. ,S:. Supreme C~ourt in 
Bank of U. S. vs. Dandridge, 
6 L. Ed. 552, 554 
with reference to action 'by Board of Directors of Bank 
of U.S. 
The case of 
Pacific States Box & Ba.sket Co. v. White, 
80 L. Ed. 138 
involved an ·order of the Department of Agriculture of 
Oregon fixing the specifi.cation of berry boxes, it was con-
tended that the rebuttable presumption of the existence 
of a: state of facts ·suffieient to justify the exertion o.f the 
police power atta.ches only to acts .of legislature; and that 
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where the reg-ulation is the act of an adm~nistrative body, 
no such presumption exists S·O' that tthe !burden of proving 
the justifyi·ng facts is upon him "\Vho seek!s to sustain the 
validity of the reg·ulation. 
Tthe Supreme c.ourt refuses to accept this and holds 
the ''presumption of the existence of facts justifying its 
specific exer·cise attaches alike to ·statutes, to muni,cipal 
ordinances, and to orders of administrative bodies''-
giving full reasoning. 
CONCLUSION. 
It is apparent from the forego·ing that if the action 
of the defendant judge, in making the Orders of January 
27, 1'940 and February 8, 1940, i·s within his jurisdiction 
t1hen it lies within the power of the judge to nullify the 
mandate of the legislature. To leave the intoxicating 
liquors, implements, furniture and fixtures in the Town 
Tavern, in the posse.ssion ·of Victor Martelle, during the 
pendency of the action means two things. In the first 
plare, that during the pendency of the a.ction Victor 
Martelle may continue to operate in his illegal venture 
without fear of additio'nal penalty, an·d in the second 
place, that upon the determination of the case a-nd the 
en teri·ng ·of the order of .confis.Cia tion, all of the prop-
erty in the premises may have disappeared. In other 
words, the entry of the Order·s herein ,c.omplaine·d of com-
pletely nullify n·ot only the P'O'wer of plaintiff to perform 
the duties imposed by law hut completely nullify the 
acts of the Legislature. 
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It is respectfully submitted that t1he Alternative Writ 
herein should be m.ade permanent, that henceforth the 
seizure and trial ·of the property -charged with violating 
the provisions of ~our Liquor ·C:ontrol Act may; be carried 
out by an orderly procedure as provided by law. 
Respeetfully submitted, 
PARNELL BLACK, 
D. HowE MoFFAT, 
GEORGE H. L:UNT, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
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